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Due to buoyant capital inflows  East Asian central banks with exchange rate targets 
accumulate foreign reserves and thereby increase surplus liquidity. East Asian central banks 
with more flexible exchange rate regimes also face surplus liquidity that mainly emanates 
from past accumulation of foreign reserves. We show based on an augmented Barro-Gordon-
type central bank loss function that in both cases surplus liquidity limits monetary policy 
autonomy. In case of fixed exchange rates East Asian central banks can escape from the 
impossible  trinity and gain monetary policy autonomy by using non-market–based 
sterilization which leads to financial sector distortions. In a flexible exchange rate regime 
monetary policy autonomy can be gained without financial sector distortions by using market-
based sterilization. As central banks face substantial sterilization costs as well as revaluation 
losses on foreign reserves, however, monetary policy autonomy is eroded. 
JEL-Code: E520, E580, F310. 
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do not necessarily represent the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 1 Introduction 
 
In the current environment of cheap and abundant global liquidity emerging market 
economies and small industrial countries continue to face buoyant capital inflows that have 
become a major threat to domestic price and financial stability. The sustained appreciation 
pressure on the currencies of emerging market economies has triggered a controversial 
discussion concerning the adequate policy response, i.e. either allowing for substantial 
appreciations (Cline and Williamson 2010), maintaining tight exchange rate pegs (McKinnon 
and Schnabl 2011) or even introducing capital controls (Ostry et al. 2010). 
 
Beyond this controversial discussion comparatively little research has scrutinized the de facto 
implications for monetary policy autonomy in flexible exchange rate regimes, when price and 
financial stability are threatened by surplus liquidity in the domestic financial system. In case 
of fixed exchange rates given Mundell’s impossible trinity central banks can only gain 
monetary policy autonomy by using non-market–based sterilization as a form of capital 
control, which – however – increases financial distortions. In contrast, flexible exchange rates 
allow for more monetary policy autonomy in the first place, but when sterilization costs and 
revaluation losses on foreign reserves emerge this autonomy can be undermined.  In an 
environment of extremely low international interest rates as they currently prevail these costs 
can be sizable. If central bank losses lead to fiscal interferences, consequences for monetary 
policy independence can be substantial. 
 
As East Asia (and in particular China) has become the most important target region of 
international capital flows we focus our research on this region. East Asia is also an important 
case study, as a broad variety of exchange rate regimes prevails from a tight peg in Hong 
Kong, to an upward crawling peg in China, to a (mainly) flexible exchange rate in Korea. 
After having defined ‘surplus liquidity’ in section 2 – we use a Barro-Gordon-type model to 
analyse the degree of monetary policy autonomy in an environment of surplus liquidity for 
different types of exchange rate regimes in section 3. In section 4 we apply the main results of 





  22 Surplus Liquidity and Monetary Policy in East Asia 
 
The influx of – what can be called – global liquidity has triggered in many emerging markets 
around the globe large scale foreign exchange intervention. This has created – what we call – 
surplus liquidity in the financial systems of emerging market economies, which strongly 
influences the monetary policy pattern of – what we call – debtor central banks, i.e. central 
banks, which aim to absorb liquidity from the domestic financial markets to maintain price 
and financial stability. In the following section we provide a concept of surplus liquidity and 
trace the origins of surplus liquidity in emerging markets with a focus on East Asia.  
 
2.1 The Concept of Surplus Liquidity 
 
Global liquidity focuses on the cross-border dimension of wider liquidity creation and has 
both an official and a private component (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2011). 
Official liquidity can only be created by central banks, while private liquidity is created by 
financial institutions in various ways and quantitatively dominates official liquidity. 
Measuring global liquidity precisely is difficult. Assessing excessive global liquidity is even 
more challenging as there is no commonly agreed equilibrium concept, in particular with 
respect to the question if excessive global liquidity triggers price increases in asset markets 
rather than in goods markets (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2008).  
 
Central bank liquidity – which is the focus of this article – is related to global liquidity, since 
the accumulation of foreign reserves triggered by private capital inflows creates reserves of 
commercial banks
1 at the central bank (central bank liquidity). Commercial banks hold 
reserves at the central bank for two reasons: (1) To fulfil reserve requirements and (2) as 
working balances, for example, to service the cash demand and payments of their clients 
(excess reserves). If excess reserves are in excess of these needs, central banks aim to control 
the surplus to avoid risks to price and financial stability since overheating could be reflected 
in increasing consumer or asset prices. Steering the interest rate for central bank liquidity (and 
not controlling its quantity) is the usual starting point of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, unless central banks have no autonomous monetary policy and directly target 
exchange rates.  
 
                                                 
1  We choose the terms “commercial banks” and “commercial banking sector” to describe money creating sector 
apart from the central bank itself. The term non-banks describes the money-holding sector, excluding 
commercial banks and the central bank.  
  3Limiting central bank liquidity quantitatively can provoke frictions in the payment system or 
a systemic shortage of currency. In this context the concept of the money multiplier should 
not be mistaken as a policy option. It describes the relationship between central bank money 
(currency in circulation and central bank liquidity) and a monetary aggregate, which is not 
necessarily stable and predictable (see Goodhart 1989, Bindseil 2004, Goodhart 2010, 
Papademos and Stark 2010). Changes of the multiplier may be driven by the payment 
behavior of nonbanks, central bank decisions on reserve requirements or commercial banks’ 
preferences for holding excess reserves. Even decisions on reserve requirements do not limit 
commercial bank balance sheet growth directly. Unremunerated reserve requirements rather 




Based on a stylized central bank balance sheet as in Figure 1, central bank liquidity can be 
defined as current account holdings of commercial banks at the central bank (item 4 and 5). 
Item 4 are excess reserves, which will increase if ceteris paribus items on the asset side 
increase or items on the liability side – apart of item 4 itself – decrease and vice versa. As 
monetary policy implementation aims to manage liquidity, excess liquidity is provided by 
other factors than monetary policy operations. These so called autonomous factors are usually 
defined as being beyond the direct control of the central bank.
3 We define them more 
explicitly as reflecting tasks that go beyond the main objective of the central bank to maintain 
price stability. As the monetary policy implementation is the starting point of the transmission 
mechanism to the ultimate objective of price stability, autonomous factors are seen as all 
other items that do not belong to the monetary policy toolkit.  
 
In the stylized central bank balance sheet in Figure 1, open market operations are monetary 
policy operations with which the central bank steers money market interest rates. They can be 
liquidity providing (item 2.1) or absorbing (item 6). Required and excess reserves (items 4 
and 5) are assumed to be central bank liquidity. Required reserves belong to the monetary 
policy toolkit. Excess reserves (item 4) represents the remaining item that is to be managed by 
the monetary policy operational framework.  
 
                                                 
2
  Reserve requirements can only control banks’ balance sheet growth directly, if central bank money cannot 
easily be increased. This used to be a relevant case historically when central bank reserve creation had to be 
backed by gold or it is the case in an orthodox currency board system (see Gray 2011, p. 5). 
3    As defined by the European Central Bank, see http://www.ecb.int/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html 
  4Figure 1: Stylized Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets  Liabilities 
1. (Net) Foreign Assets (NFA)  3. Currency in Circulation (CIC) 
4. Excess Reserves  
2. Domestic Assets 
    2.1 Open Market Operations (OMO) 
    2.2 Other Credits to Private Sector 
    2.3 Other Net Credit to Government 
5. Required Reserves  
6. OMO 
7. Capital accounts 
 
On the asset side, autonomous factors are (net) foreign assets (item 1). They mainly include 
foreign reserves, which normally originate in foreign exchange interventions.
4 Items 2.2 and 
2.3 summarize domestic assets that are held for other purposes than monetary policy 
operations, e.g. for investment purposes or for financial system restructuring (item 2.2: other 
credit to the private sector), or for financing the government and/or public entities (item 2.3: 
other net credit to the government), or simply for fulfilling the fiscal agent function (if item 
2.3 is negative, it reflects changes of government deposits at the central bank. In practice, it 
can be difficult to distinguish between domestic assets that are autonomous factors and that 
are monetary policy operations. Credit to the government, for instance, can reflect a monetary 
policy operation and it can reflect monetary financing. Similarly, a claim to a commercial 
bank can arise from regular monetary policy operations, but also from financial sector bail-out 
operations.  
 
On the liability side currency in circulation is an autonomous factor (item 3), because 
servicing the cash needs of the public is a central bank task and should not be used as a 
monetary policy instrument.
5 Item 7 (capital accounts) represents the own funds of the central 
bank, which is regarded as an autonomous factor as well. 
 
Based on the identification of autonomous factors we define surplus liquidity as the difference 
between the sum of autonomous factors on the asset side (items 1, 2.2 and 2.3 in Figure 1) 
and the sum of autonomous factors on the liability side (item 3 and 7 in Figure 1).
6 A positive 
sign of this term is equivalent to structural surplus liquidity in the banking system. 
Autonomous liquidity providing factors are larger than autonomous liquidity absorbing 
                                                 
4   We assume for parsimony reasons that net foreign assets are exclusively held in form of foreign reserves. 
Holdings of gold are assumed to be constant. 
5    Otherwise, a restrictive monetary policy stance could trigger a shortage of cash and thereby serious risks for 
payments and financial stability.  
6  
We assume that the level of excess reserves, that is needed as a working balance of the commercial banks, is 
close to zero.   
  5factors. Without liquidity absorbing monetary policy instruments (in Figure 1 items 5 and 6), 
this would lead to increasing excess reserves, declining interest rates and thereby risks for 
price (and financial) stability.
  
 
For instance, foreign currency purchases of the central bank from commercial banks would 
lead to higher current account holdings of commercial banks at the central bank that go 
beyond required reserves and the minimum excess reserves (which we assume to be zero for 
simplicity). The commercial banks would search for new investment opportunities, which can 
lead to a lower interest rate, excessive credit growth, asset price booms and/or inflation above 
target. To maintain its benchmark of consumer and/or asset price stability, the central bank 
may feel required to manage liquidity via monetary policy operations on the liability side of 
its balance sheet.  
 
2.2 Origins of Surplus Liquidity and Liquidity Absorption by Debtor Central Banks 
 
If the central bank has other tasks that go beyond maintaining price and financial stability, i.e. 
exchange rate stabilization, financial system restructuring or government financing, surplus 
liquidity can be sizable. Figure 2 summarizes possible origins of surplus liquidity for a set of 
157 countries.  
 

























Source: IMF: IFS, national central banks. 
  6We distinguish three liquidity sources: net foreign reserve accumulation (NFA, item 1 in 
Figure 1), net central bank credit to the government (NCG, item 2.3) and private credit (PC, 
item 2.1 and 2.2.). While the first is clearly an autonomous factor, the latter two can either be 
monetary policy operations or autonomous factors depending on the underlying motivation. 
We put these three central bank balance sheet positions into relationship to the sum of 
currency in circulation (CIC, item 3) and the capital accounts of the central bank (Cap, item 
7), which are the autonomous factors on the liability side of the central bank balance sheets. 
We introduce a time dimension by plotting the ratios for the three relationships 
(NFA/(CIC+Cap), NCG/(CIC+Cap), PC/(CIC+Cap),) for the year 2000 on the y-axis and for 
the year 2008 on the x-axis. 
 
A ratio above zero signals liquidity to be created by the accumulation of the respective 
liquidity source. A ratio above unity signals surplus liquidity originating from one single 
factor. A negative ratio stands for net liquidity absorption by one single factor. If, as for 
instance in the case of many oil exporting countries, government deposits at the central bank 
are larger than the central bank’ holdings of government bonds, the term NCG turns negative, 
which indicates a liquidity absorbing role of net credit to the government.
7 It is clearly visible 
from Figure 2 that both in the year 2000 and the year 2008 net foreign reserve accumulation 
has been the dominating source of liquidity creation in a majority of countries (most circles 
are above the zero line). For a large number of countries, the circles are located even above 
one, which indicates surplus liquidity created due to foreign reserve accumulation.  
 
In comparison, for private credit and net credit to the government the impact on the liquidity 
position is mixed or negligible. For a significant number of countries, a liquidity absorbing 
role of the net credit to the government position can be observed (crosses below zero). The 
45-degree line helps to identify the evolution of the role of reserve accumulation for surplus 
liquidity creation since the turn of the millennium. The cluster of circles is below the line and 
in the positive range of the x-axis indicating that the degree of surplus liquidity creation 
through reserve accumulation has substantially increased between 2000 and 2008. 
 
Figure 3 in detail illustrates the rising role of surplus liquidity originating in reserve 
accumulation for two East Asian central banks. In 2000 the Bank Indonesia had two main 
                                                 
7   For more details on liquidity absorption via government deposits at the central bank see Schnabl and Schobert 
(2009). 
  7sources of liquidity creation: financial restructuring after the Asian crisis
8 and foreign reserve 
accumulation as shown in the left panel of Figure 3. Since then, the stock of foreign assets 
and thereby the proxy of surplus liquidity (liquidity providing autonomous factors minus 
liquidity absorbing autonomous factors as indicated by the black surface) have substantially 
increased. This was the case despite the official move towards an inflation targeting 
framework in 2005.   
 








































































































Bank Negara Malaysia 
Source: IMF: IFS. 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia has similarly created surplus liquidity due to foreign exchange 
accumulation until 2008. Until mid 2005 the Malaysian ringgit was tightly pegged to the US 
dollar, but even after the move towards more flexible rates the accumulation of foreign 
reserves and thereby the creation of surplus liquidity persisted. Although reserve 
accumulation temporarily stopped with the global crisis starting in 2008, the surplus liquidity 
position as indicated by the black surface in Figure 3 remained in place.
9  
 
Figure 4 shows the ratio of net foreign assets to currency in circulation from 2000 to 2010 for 
all East Asian central banks. A ratio of net foreign assets to currency in circulation plus 
capital greater than unity indicates – based on our measure – surplus liquidity. No later than 
2001 all central banks in this region were facing structural surplus liquidity in the banking 
system due to foreign exchange accumulation. Importantly, this applies for both countries 
                                                 
8   The Bank Indonesia purchased government bonds that were explicitly issued for financing bank rescue 
measures and that were remunerated below market rates.  
9   Given that foreign exchange accumulation has stopped the surplus liquidity position continues as long as the 
stock of foreign reserves is ceteris paribus larger than the liquidity absorbing factors. The central bank can 
absorb liquidity by selling foreign reserves, but this would tighten monetary conditions and feed into an 
appreciation of the domestic currency. Thus escaping from the surplus liquidity position would have high 
opportunity costs.  
  8with a fixed exchange rate regime such as Hong Kong as well as countries with a floating 
exchange rate regime such as South Korea. 
 









































Source: IMF: IFS, national central banks. 
 
The pattern observed in East Asia is typical for many central banks in emerging markets and 
developing countries around the globe facing buoyant capital inflows. Exchange rate 
stabilization triggers liquidity providing foreign exchange interventions.
10  Concerns about 
domestic price and asset market stability make liquidity absorbing monetary policy operations 
necessary. As they take place on the liability side of the balance sheets we dub central banks, 
which structurally engage in liquidity absorbing monetary policy operations as ‘debtor central 
banks’. This pattern of monetary policy making is in sharp contrast to the central banks in the 
large advanced economies, which perform their monetary policies on the asset side of the 
balance sheets usually providing liquidity to the financial sector (creditor central banks).
11  
 
2.3 Management of Surplus Liquidity in East Asia and Risks for the Central Bank 
 
In general, debtor central banks have three options to absorb surplus liquidity. (1) They can 
absorb surplus liquidity by using market-oriented monetary policy operations, for instance 
central bank bond sales or reverse repos (item 6). (2) They can use non-market based 
                                                 
10 There are different explanations for this preference for exchange rate stabilization. See, for example, 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004).  
11   For a detailed distinction between debtor and credit central banks see Löffler, Schnabl and Schobert (2010).  
  9measures, for example reserve requirements (item 5) with no or low remuneration or the 
coercive sale of central bank securities below market rates. (3) The central bank can 
coordinate its liquidity management with the government. Such fiscal coordination can take 
two forms. Firstly, the central bank stores foreign exchange on behalf of the government (and 
agrees to hold the revenues on its account with the central bank). This is most common in 
case of oil-exporting countries where the government either owns the exported natural 
resources or heavily taxes the export revenues.
12  
 
Secondly, if the central bank has purchased foreign exchange from the private sector, the 
operation will be liquidity providing to the domestic banking system. The fiscal authorities 
can agree to issue and sell more government securities than necessary to cover the budget 
deficit. The revenues from the excess issuance of government bonds can be held as 
government deposits at the central bank. Usually the absorption of liquidity via government 
deposits at the central bank requires a formal agreement between the central bank and the 
government to ensure that the government does not use these funds freely thereby creating 
liquidity that threatens price stability.  
 
Figure 5 shows the sterilization instruments for three East Asian central banks in the lower 
parts of the left hand charts. The Bank of Korea (upper left panel) mainly uses sales of central 
bank bonds (monetary stabilization bonds) to drain liquidity from the markets, which has been 
created by foreign currency purchases. The yields of these bonds are tightly linked to 
interbank interest rates (upper right panel), which is an indication for market based 
sterilization. Since 2007, there is a small spread between the interbank rate and the yield on 
monetary stabilization bonds. This can be due to higher risk awareness during the crisis, 
which causes nearly riskless investment at the central bank to carry a lower interest rate as 
lending in the interbank market.  
 
The Peoples Bank of China (middle left panel of Figure 5) uses a combination of market and 
non-market based instruments to absorb liquidity. Central bank bills represent in our 
interpretation market-based sterilization, as their yields are closely following interbank rates. 
Nevertheless, the fact that these yields remain well below the interbank rate during most of 
                                                 
12   The government deposits at the central bank will have no liquidity providing effect as long as they are held at 
the central bank account and not spend in the domestic market. Alternatively the oil revenues are stored 
directly in a dollar denominated sovereign wealth fund. As foreign reserves are prevented from being 
converted into domestic currency, a sovereign wealth fund corresponds to „anticipatory sterilization“ as 
surplus liquidity creation is prevented from the very beginning (McKinnon and Schnabl 2010). 
  10the observation period could be an indication for coercive sales of these liquidity absorbing 
instruments to the domestic banking sector below market rates (see middle right panel of 
Figure 5). Reserve requirements represent non-market based sterilization, as the remuneration 
rate remains widely unchanged and mostly below interbank interest rates. Figure 5 also shows 
that over time in China the importance of non-market based sterilization has increased relative 
to (comparatively) market based sterilization.  
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Singapore – Policy Rates 
Source: IMF: IFS, national central banks. 
 
  11The Monetary Authority of Singapore (lower left panel) sterilizes a large share of its net 
foreign asset acquisitions via net government deposits at the central bank. As the fiscal agent 
of the government the Monetary Authority of Singapore manages the issuance of government 
securities. Given Singapore’s persistent budget surpluses the issuance of government 
securities is not used for government financing but to deepen the financial market and for 
sterilization purposes. The repo rate on government securities tightly follows the interbank 
interest rate (lower right panel), which is evidence for a market-based sterilization process.  
 
Depending on the sterilization instruments and individual agreements the costs are shared 
between the public and the private sector. Under market based liquidity management – as for 
instance in Korea – the costs are usually born by the central bank and ultimately by the public 
via lower central bank profit transfers to the government. Non-market based liquidity 
absorption – as for instance in China – shifts the costs to the commercial banks, which may 
shift it onwards to their customers. Under fiscal coordination – as for instance in Singapore – 
the costs can be borne by the government or the central bank, depending on the agreements, 
and ultimately by the public. 
 
Another cost factor of foreign reserve accumulation cum liquidity absorption are write-downs 
on the foreign currency positions that emerge when the domestic currency appreciates. Both 
costs can cause sizable central bank losses. Whether central bank losses are problematic 
depends on the degree of central bank independence and its success to communicate it 
appropriately. In practice, however, central bank losses often cause conflicts with the 
government and therefore, can have a negative impact on the reputation of the central bank 
and ultimately, on its independence.  
 
3. Limited Monetary Policy Autonomy of Debtor Central Banks 
 
We will show that in an environment of globally abundant liquidity the degree of monetary 
policy autonomy will be limited, whatever exchange rate regime emerging markets choose. 
Given fixed exchange rates the scope for monetary policy autonomy is generally low, but 
non-market based sterilization as a form of capital controls creates some leeway for a 
diversion of the monetary policy stance from the anchor country. Given flexible exchange 
rates, an illusion of monetary policy autonomy is created in the first place, which is unlikely 
  12to materialize in the long run, as increasing sterilization costs limit the autonomy from the 
monetary policy stance of the reserve / anchor currency country. 
 
3.1 Gaining and Losing Monetary Policy Autonomy Given Fixed Exchange Rates 
 
Based on Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) a basic postulate of open economy 
macroeconomics is the incompatibility of pegged exchange rates, international capital 
mobility and national monetary policy autonomy (impossible trinity). Given fixed exchange 
rates central banks can only gain monetary policy autonomy if they introduce capital controls. 
In the context of sterilization policies this corresponds to the use of non-market based 
liquidity absorption, for instance through unremunerated required reserves. Increasing reserve 
requirements can have similar results as tightening of capital controls (Reinhart and Reinhart 
1999).  
 
Due to the quasi tax effect of unremunerated reserve requirements bank lending rates will 
increase and/or deposit rates will decrease depending on the availability of substitutes in the 
credit and deposit market. Whether the widening of the banking system interest rate spread 
prevents further capital inflows, depends inter alia on the type of capital inflow and the stage 
of development of the domestic financial market. For instance if the corporate bond market is 
underdeveloped and the access to foreign lending markets is limited firms will rely more on 
the domestic credit market and banks can shift the tax burden to the loan market. In addition 
lower deposit rates will make investment in the domestic banking sector less attractive to non-
residents. Under these assumptions a monetary tightening in form of higher reserve 
requirements would help to forestall additional capital inflows. The widening of the spread of 
bank interest rates, however, implies distortions in the financial sector. i.e. financial 
disintermediation.  
 
Assuming that the central bank dislikes financial sector distortions, we analyze the impact of 
liquidity absorbing operations on monetary policy independence based on an augmented 
version of a Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) type central bank loss 
function. In contrast to the baseline model it is assumed that the central bank has no output 
stabilization objective,
13 but trades off inflation against financial sector distortions by 
deciding on the degree of liquidity absorption in the face of a foreign interest rate shock. Non-
                                                 
13  We omit the output stabilization target for parsimony reasons as it is not important for the interpretation of 
results. 
  13market based sterilization is assumed to be linked to financial sector distortions. In our model, 
this causes a disutility/ loss for the central bank. 
 




2 0.5( ) LF rr    . 
 
The term ()
2 refers to the inflation target which is assumed to be zero. An inflation rate 
below or above zero implies a loss for the central bank. The term rr models the degree of 
distortion in the financial system, which is assumed to be linked to the degree of non-market 
based sterilization reflected in unremunerated reserve requirements per unit of deposits rr. 
Given perfect competition between domestic banks an increase of rr  reflects a higher 
distortion. The factor   is the weight determining the size of disutility of financial distortions 
in the central bank objective function (with   > 0).  
 
Inflation is assumed to be based on the inflation of the previous period pre. Further, we 
assume a negative impact of the domestic interest rate on loans iL on inflation dependent on 
the semi-interest rate elasticity of inflation .  The term   is a normal distributed demand 
shock on inflation with zero mean: 
 
(2)  pre L i       
 
Assuming that the costs of required reserves are (partially) shifted to the domestic interest rate 
on loans iL there is a positive correlation  between the loan rate and reserve requirements rr, 
which is usually smaller than unity (0 <   1).  The term   is assumed to contain all 
financial market characteristics affecting the transmission of   to i L, contingent on the 
transmission of rr to deposit interest rates. 
rr
 
(3)  L ir r    
 
To link the sterilization operations with the interest rate policy in the anchor country, we 
assume that a declining interest rate in the anchor region (US) leads ceteris paribus to rising 
capital inflows into the emerging market economies (East Asia). To defend the exchange rate 
                                                 
14   Time subscripts are omitted for parsimony. 
  14peg the central bank has to buy foreign reserves which necessitate a larger volume of 
sterilization operations, if it aims at price and financial stability. Thus, there is a positive 
correlation between the scale factor   - which affects the transmission of   to iL - and the 




(4)  f i          with  0   . 
 
Substituting (4), (3) and (2) into (1) yields the following expected loss function  () E LF : 
 
(5) 
2 () 0 . 5 ( ) pr f e EL F ir r r r       . 
 









Optimal inflation will be higher, if the central bank has a high preference to avoid financial 
distortions, indicated by a high  . If the interest rate transmission to inflation is low
15, 
indicated by a low  and if the foreign interest rate is low optimal inflation is high. This 
implies that a mandate for the central bank to avoid financial distortions (0 )    makes the 
central bank dependent on the monetary policy stance of the anchor country. If the central 
bank does not care about financial distortions (  approximates zero) it would be fully 
independent from foreign monetary policy decisions and optimal inflation would be in line 
with the assumed inflation target.   
 
3.2 Scope of Autonomy of Free Floating Countries 
 
If the exchange rate floats freely, no interventions take place and the level of foreign reserves 
remains unchanged. The impossible trinity would suggest that a central bank has full 
autonomy in monetary policy making even given free capital flows. The monetary policy 
strategy could be inflation targeting. In contrast to the fixed exchange rate case a debtor 
central bank with an inflation target can engage in market based sterilization operations – and 
therefore can avoid financial distortions – because additional capital inflows attracted by the 
                                                 
15 The central bank has to create huge distortions as a high lending rate is required to curb inflation. When the 
central bank dislikes these distortions it will allow for higher inflation. 
  15resulting rise of interest rates do not trigger additional foreign reserve accumulation and 
monetary expansion.  
 
We will show, however, that a debtor central bank, which conducts an autonomous monetary 
policy by setting interest rates based on liquidity absorbing monetary policy operations faces 
limitations in monetary policy autonomy even under principally flexible exchange rates. The 
reason is that in the face of buoyant capital inflows debtor central banks will run into 
sterilization costs and revaluation losses on the stock of foreign reserves.
16 These losses erode 
the capital of the central bank. In our model the central bank needs recapitalization by the 
government. This will strengthen the government’s position in urging the central bank 
towards (growth enhancing) and cost avoiding interest rate cuts.  
 
To analyze the degree of dependence of the central bank, which allows for a freely floating 
exchange rate and which is engaged in market based liquidity management the central bank 
loss function of equation (1) is modified by incorporating losses due to sterilization costs and 
revaluation of foreign reserves: 
 
(7)    ) ) ˆ ( ( 5 . 0
2 NFA e if iSL DUM LF      
 
Whereas the first term of equation (7) remains unchanged (inflation target at zero), the second 
part represents the costs of liquidity management, subdivided in sterilization costs and 
revaluation losses. With respect to the sterilization costs we assume in contrast to the fixed 
exchange rate case that sterilization operations will be market based. We further assume that 
in line with our observation in section 2, liquidity expansion in the past has originated in 
foreign reserve accumulation. The cost of liquidity absorbing instruments is given by the 
interest rate paid on the liquidity absorbing instruments i times the outstanding stock of 
sterilization debt SL which is assumed to be equal to surplus liquidity defined in section 2. 
Revenues on foreign reserves (if * NFA) comprise interest revenues resulting from foreign 
exchange holdings.  
 
In the face of net capital inflows (outflows) revaluation losses (gains) of an appreciating 
(depreciating) domestic currency occur. The revaluation losses are proxied by the percentage 
                                                 
16 For instance during the period from 2004 to 2007 the Bank of Korea accumulated interest rate losses of 
roughly 0.5 percent of GDP. In the same period the revaluation adjustment account increased to a book loss 
of 1.7 percent of GDP. The revaluation account records valuation gains and losses accruing during a 
predefined period until the gains/losses are realized.  
  16exchange rate change   times the stock of net foreign assets NFA with a negative value of   
indicating appreciation. The term γ determines the degree of independence of the central 
bank.  
ˆ e ˆ e
 
As central banks normally have no objective to maximize profits (in contrast to limit deficits) 
the second term of equation (7) will be only relevant if the central bank is running losses. 
Thus the dummy variable DUM  takes the value of 0 as long as the central banks’ capital 
(Cap) minus central bank losses is above a particular threshold T . In this case the second part 
of equation (7) cancels out meaning that monetary policy decisions are independent from 
sterilization costs. If the capital falls below the threshold T  the costs will become a relevant 
factor for monetary policy decisions. Principally the threshold T can be assumed to be above, 
at, or below zero depending on the preference of the central bank or its statutory requirements 











Cap (iSL (if  ˆ  e  )NFA) T,
Cap (iSL (if  ˆ  e  )NFA)  T.
        
 
 
The term   (with  > 0) models the weight of financial losses in the central bank objective 
function for the case that DUM=1. A large gamma stands for a larger concern of the central 
bank with regard to a ‘conditioned recapitalization’ by the government. 
 
Because without distortionary reserve requirements the interest rate transmission from the 
money market rate to interest (loan) rates set by commercial banks is perfect (in contrast to 
the fixed exchange rate case (3)) the money market rate is used as determinant of inflation. 
 
(9)  pre i       
 
The money market rate is assumed to be directly linked to the central bank policy rate, which 
is assumed to be set – at least in the first place – to maintain price stability. The endogenous 
variable is the exchange rate change, which is assumed to be determined by the relative 
monetary policy stance of the domestic central bank and the central bank of the large 
reference country, i.e. the domestic and foreign interest rate spread: 
 
(10)  .  ˆ () ei f i   
  17The term   indicates the sensitivity of the exchange rate on interest rate differentials. With  
 =0 and  = -1 uncovered interest parity, UIP, holds. If kappa is larger than -1, carry trades 
will be profitable as interest gains will not be eroded by exchange rate losses. The term 

  is a 
normally distributed error term with zero mean.  
 
Substituting (9) and (10) into (7) yields the following expected loss function for the central 
bank in a freely floating environment: 
 
 (11)    ) ) 1 ( ) ( ( ) ( 5 . 0 ) (
2 NFA ifNFA NFA SL i DUM i LF E pre               
 
Based on equation (11) we can derive the optimum interest rate of the debtor central bank 
contingent on losses generated by sterilization costs and revaluation. In doing so, we 
distinguish two cases. Firstly, the capital of the central bank remains – despite sterilization 
and appreciation – above the threshold (DUM=0). The second term of the loss function 
cancels out. Optimizing eq. (11) with respect to the policy instrument i, the optimal interest 
rate is: 
 




  . 
 
The interest rate is set with respect to inflation of the previous period and the semi-interest 
rate elasticity of inflation . 
 
Secondly, if the sterilization operations reduce the capital of the central bank below the 
threshold (DUM=1) the central bank will care about sterilization losses and react to it by 
setting interest rates lower than otherwise. With surplus liquidity (SL) being equivalent to 
NFA – CIC – Cap the optimum interest rate is equal to: 
 












The optimum interest rate will be lower, if surplus liquidity and foreign reserves are high. 
Equation (12) and (13) represent the corner solutions in which either the central bank is 
profitable and sets the policy rate according to the inflation target (full monetary policy 
  18autonomy (12)) or – in the loss environment – trades off inflation performance with 
profitability (limited monetary policy autonomy (13)). 
 
To decide whether eq. (12) or (13) is valid we use equation (8) to determine the scope of 
monetary policy autonomy (FDUM). Assuming that the threshold T is zero, the dummy is 
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To show the scope of monetary policy autonomy of the debtor central bank using market 
based measures to absorb surplus liquidity we plot in Figure 6 the two corner solutions for i 
and the dummy function against if.  
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The upper part of the function  0 DUM LF   (upper horizontal line) corresponds to the optimal 
policy decision if the capital of the central bank is positive above the threshold T (dummy is 
zero). The interest rate decision is fully independent from the foreign interest rate in the 
anchor country and is derived according to equation (12). The interest rate is set with respect 
to previous inflation and the semi-interest rate elasticity of inflation. 
 
The lower part of the function  1 DUM LF   (lower horizontal line) shows the optimal policy 
response if the dummy is active, i.e. the central bank generates losses from sterilization 
  19operations, which reduces its capital position below the threshold. The incentive to lower the 
interest rate compared to   rises contingent on the stock of net foreign assets NFA, the 
semi-interest rate elasticity of exchange rate changes 
0 DUM LF 
 , the amount of surplus liquidity SL 
and the weight of central bank losses   in the loss function. The lower is the weight   the 
more independent is the central bank from fiscal interferences and the less it reacts to foreign 
interest rate decisions. In the extreme case of   being equal to zero, the second function 
coincides with the first function. Interest rate decisions in the reserve currency country which 
affect the financial soundness of the central bank become irrelevant.  
 
The third function  DUM F
NFA
 (sloped line) models the scope for monetary policy autonomy 
dependent on the foreign interest rate. If the foreign interest rates decrease, the central bank 
will decrease its interest rate to avoid losses. However, in doing so it will violate its inflation 
target. On average   is zero and can be neglected. Under a given foreign interest rate   
the higher the capital buffer Ca , the lower surplus liquidity SL and – depending on   – the 
lower the stock of net foreign assets  NFA,  the larger is the scope for monetary policy 
autonomy as the 
if
p 
DUM F  schedule shifts upwards (see the first term) and the slope becomes 
steeper (see the second term).  
 
A high stock of net foreign assets implies high interest income but also high valuation losses 
in the case of an appreciating exchange rate. Therefore as long as the sensitivity of changes in 
the interest rate spread on exchange rate changes   is larger than -1, valuation losses 
dominate the interest revenue and the central bank is running losses on a net basis. In Figure 
A1 in the appendix we present evidence, that the term   rather is positive for the selected 
East Asian countries during the sample period and that we can neglect the UIP assumption in 
practice. In Figure A2 of the appendix we will show different scenarios of Figure 6, if 
currency in circulation, net foreign assets, capital or the relationship between the interest rate 
spread and exchange rate changes.  
 
Most importantly, there is a critical value for the foreign interest rate ifcrit that determines the 
threshold for monetary policy autonomy. If the foreign interest rate if shrinks below ifcrit the 
central bank adjusts its interest rate on sterilization operations to avoid central bank losses 
(light gray area in Figure 6). The lower the foreign interest rate, the larger the incentive to cut 
  20domestic interest rates. If ifcrit is sufficiently low the debtor central bank will not decrease 
domestic interest rates further as the inflation term dominates the loss term in equation (11).  
 
4. Central Bank Losses and Interest Rate Decisions in East Asia  
 
In section 3 we have shown that a debtor central bank using market based sterilization tools to 
manage liquidity conditions is dependent on the foreign country’s monetary policy stance. 
The dependence of debtor central banks on the foreign monetary policy stance relates to (1) 
the degree of structural surplus liquidity, (2) the impact of changes in the interest rate 
differential on the exchange rate and (3) the capital buffer of the central bank. We test for the 
impact of central bank losses on interest rate decisions in East Asia contingent on these three 
factors. This is in particular relevant for debtor central banks with (mostly) freely floating 
exchange rates and market based sterilization.  
 
4.1 Identifying Market Based Sterilizing Debtor Central Banks in East Asia 
 
Table 1 shows a measure of market based sterilization instruments as a share of total 
sterilization instruments. It assumes that reserve requirements are non-market based whereas 
all other liquidity absorbing instruments are market based.
17  
 
Table 1: Market Based Instruments as a Share of Total Sterilization Instruments  






































































































Source: IMF: IFS, national central banks. Shaded cells mark loss making years.  
                                                 
17  The measure is calculated as  / . The term RR denotes the amount of 
required reserve balances of commercial banks held at the central bank. The data comes from IMF IFS and 
national central banks. If central banks have net claims to the government this is seen as indication for 
monetary financing of the government via the central bank or financial restructuring based on the central 
bank, which increases the surplus liquidity. Then, these claims are added to the numerator of the fraction 
leading to  / ( . 
) ( 100 100 t RR t CIC t NFA    
) t RR t CIC NCG
t   t CIC t NFA  
) ( t Cap t CIC t NFA  
) t Cap ( 100 100 t NFA   
  21The central banks of Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand primarily 
sterilize with market-based instruments. Singapore is a special case, market-based sterilization 
instruments are used under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
 
Singapore and Hong Kong have a very high degree of capital mobility (highest possible score 
of the Chinn-Ito-Index
18 on capital mobility) and a high degree of exchange rate stability.
19 
For these countries, sterilizing surplus liquidity reflects the objective to freeze ‘free’ liquidity 
available to banks for macro prudential reasons. They don’t follow an autonomous monetary 
policy as interest rates are set close to those of the anchor currency country as shown in 
Figure 7. In both countries the policy rates closely follow the US interest rate. In Singapore 
the moderate divergence from the US policy rate can be explained by the fact that other 
currencies (euro, yen) are represented in the currency basket. 
 






















Source: IMF: IFS. 
 
The Peoples Bank of China corresponds to our notion of a central bank operating under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, which aims to gain monetary policy autonomy through non-
market based sterilization. The left panel of Figure 8 shows that despite the tight exchange 
rate peg to the dollar the Chinese money market rate does not follow the US money market 
rate, which indicates a certain degree of autonomy in monetary policy making.  
 
                                                 
18   For a definition of this index see Chinn and Ito 2008. 
19   Hong Kong has a currency board arrangement with a fixed exchange rate to the USD and Singapore pegs to a 
basket of currencies. 
























































Lending-Deposit Rate Spread (right scale)
Reserve Requirements, Big Banks
Reserve Requirements, Small Banks
Source: Peoples Bank of China. 
 
The permanent increase of required reserves (right panel of Figure 8) indicates that the policy 
goal of low inflation outweighs the downsides of financial repression.
20 The high required 
reserve ratio as well as the spread between banks’ lending and deposit rates and their spread 
versus the money market rate indicates a relatively low preference for avoiding financial 
distortions of the Peoples Bank of China. 
 
4.2. Market Based Debtor Central Banks 
 
For East Asian countries, which mainly conduct market based sterilization in combination 
with (managed) floating exchange rates and (widely) autonomous monetary policies 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand) we test the model in two 
steps. Firstly, we calculate a benchmark target interest rate for “autonomous” interest rate 
decisions of the freely floating countries in East Asia based on a Taylor rule. Then, we 
subtract the realized interest rate from the Taylor rule benchmark and normalize it to a scale 















                                                 
20 This is congruent to China’s growth strategy of supporting exports via an undervalued real exchange rate 
(McKinnon and Schnabl 2011).  
21 The supscript t denotes the time index. 
  23with the Taylor interest rate (TR) being derived from the original Taylor (1993) rule.
22 An 
index value greater (smaller) than zero means that the actual policy rate is too low (high) 
compared to the Taylor rule benchmark.  
 
Secondly, we calculate a dependency index, which shows based on equation (8) the central 
bank losses given the assumption that central banks would have set the Taylor interest rate.  
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If both indices are highly positive, it suggests that the central bank keeps interest rates lower 
than warranted to avoid losses.  
 
Both indices are calculated for the period from 2000 to end of 2010 based on quarterly data. 
For Korea (upper left panel in Figure 9) in most periods both indices are positively correlated. 
Since the end of 2001 the dependency index started to increase together with the negative 
deviation of the policy rate from its Taylor benchmark indicating limited monetary policy 
autonomy from the US. An exception is the period from the end of 2004 to 2007 in which the 
dependency index remained high, but the Taylor rule index decreased.  
 
This corresponds to the time period, when the Bank of Korea has followed an autonomous 
policy but at the same time has faced massive central bank losses (highlighted area) and 
respective losses of capital. Equity remained negative until the third quarter of 2008. Then, 
interest rates declined relative to the Taylor rule benchmark (high index value), which helped 
to reduce sterilization costs and revaluations losses on foreign reserves. Given the low interest 
rate environment in the US and the recovery from the crisis in Korea both indices started to 
rise again since 2010 again associated to a period of low monetary policy autonomy.
23 A 
similar pattern of periods with different degrees of monetary policy autonomy can be 
observed for Thailand (middle left panel of Figure 9).  
                                                 
* 22 The Taylor rule is given by   with  ** 0.5( ) 0.5( ) TR r y y tt tt tt       t   as the inflation rate,  as the implied 
equilibrium (real) interest rate, 
* r
*
t  as the inflation target,  yt as the log real GDP and  * yt  as the log of potential 
output. We assume a constant equilibrium real interest rate of 2 percent for each country. In case the inflation 
target is unknown we use a linear trend of actual inflation. 
23 In that period the deviation from the Taylor rule benchmark, however, could be linked to an unconventional 
monetary policy during the crisis targeting at stabilizing the banking system.  



































































































































































Taylor Interest Rate Deviation (Index)
Dependency Index
Philippines 
Source: IMF: IFS, national sources, own calculations. Note: shaded areas mark loss making 
years. 
 
The losses in the beginning of the new millennium originated in interest disbursements paid 
on external loans which the Bank of Thailand had received during the Asian crisis and in 
revaluation losses on the stock of net foreign assets as a floating exchange rate regime was 
introduced in 1997. The sources of losses in the period from 2005 to 2007 were high interest 
payments on central bank bonds and debt securities as well as valuation losses due to an 
autonomous monetary policy (low Taylor rule index and high dependency index). 
  25In contrast to the Bank of Korea and Bank of Thailand the central banks of Taiwan and - to a 
lesser extend – Malaysia have followed the US interest rate policy (see Figure 10) and thereby 
avoided central bank losses. Accordingly, the Taylor rule and dependency index are highly 
correlated. 
 





















Source: IMF: IFS, Reuters. 
 
Regarding the central banks of Indonesia and the Philippines (lower Panels of Figure 9) 
although both central banks have been using a portfolio of market and non-market based 
measures to absorb surplus liquidity they run losses in particular years reflecting some degree 
of resistance to losing monetary policy autonomy. The Bank Indonesia suffered losses due to 
high interest payments on its own debt certificates partly issued for bank restructuring. In 
2007 the central bank of the Philippines had a large loss of roughly 1.3 percent of GDP 
because of high interest payments on central bank securities and revaluation losses on the 




In this paper, we define surplus liquidity and relate it to the policy challenges of central banks 
in East Asia. They face a policy dilemma. High capital inflows put appreciating pressure on 
their exchange rates. Interventions in the foreign exchange market aim to avoid an 
appreciation, but lead to an increasing stock of foreign reserves and therefore undue liquidity 
creation. To control surplus liquidity, central banks can opt for more or less market-oriented 
sterilization measures. Market based measures lead to increasing interest rates and fuel 
  26additional capital inflows turning sterilization attempts ineffective. Non-market based 
measures such as unremunerated required reserves can help to escape the impossible trinity, if 
they successfully restrict capital inflows. The benefit is uncertain as unremunerated reserve 
requirements lead to distortions of the domestic financial system. This limits monetary policy 
independence.  
Another way to escape the policy dilemma is to let the exchange rate float. We show that 
debtor central banks then still depend on the past accumulation of foreign reserves. 
Sterilization costs and valuation losses emerge, if the interest differential to the anchor 
country is positive and the exchange rate appreciates. Given that the central bank cares about 
these losses, the degree of dependence of these debtor central banks on the foreign monetary 
policy stance hinges on the degree of structural surplus liquidity, the impact of changes in the 
interest rate differential on the exchange rate, and the capital buffer of the central bank.  
 
Thus, flexible exchange rates allow for more monetary policy autonomy in the first place, but 
when sterilization costs and revaluation losses on foreign reserves emerge, this autonomy is 
undermined. Reducing the structural surplus liquidity and thus restoring monetary policy 
autonomy will take place only gradually over time, as it mainly depends on the evolution of 
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Source: IMF: IFS, national sources.  
 
The straight line indicates the theoretical relationship between exchange rate changes 
(positive means depreciation) and the foreign and domestic interest rate differential if UIP 
would hold. As obvious the actual realizations are very volatile and the empirical trend of the 
link between exchange rate changes and the interest rate spread even would suggest a reverse 
correlation indicating protracted carry trades.  
 
Figure A2 shows different configurations of the impact of a decrease of surplus liquidity on 
the scope for monetary policy autonomy derived from the theoretical discussion of section 3. 
As surplus liquidity is defined as NFA-CIC-Cap the upper panels and the lower left panel of 
Figure A2 distinguishes the change of the scope for autonomy when CIC expands, the capital 
buffer increases or NFA decreases. Ceteris paribus in all three cases monetary policy 
autonomy increases, however, with different magnitudes. Improving the capital buffer has the 
largest impact as the sloped line shifts upwards (more than in the case when CIC increases) 
and the slope becomes steeper (more than in the case when NFA decreases). The lower right 
panel shows the increase in the scope for monetary policy autonomy when kappa gets smaller. 
If kappa approaches minus one (UIP hold) the central bank would be completely autonomous 
from the foreign monetary policy stance as the net interest expenses on sterilization 
instruments are compensated by valuation gains on the stock of net foreign assets.  


























































































ifcrit  if 
i 
Kappa decreases 
 